dcsimg
 

BugTraq: Advisory: Chili!Soft ASP Multiple Vulnerabilities

by ServerWatch Staff

A posting to BugTraq shares a few security problems with Chili!Soft ASP.

Date: Tue, 20 Feb 2001 22:35:43 +0000
From: Stan Bubrouski
To: BUGTRAQ@SECURITYFOCUS.COM
Subject: Advisory: Chili!Soft ASP Multiple Vulnerabilities

Author:   Stan Bubrouski (stan@ccs.neu.edu)
Date:   February 20, 2001
Package:  Chili!Soft ASP
Versions affected:  3.5.2 and possibly previous versions.
Severity:  (1) A remote user could potentially view sensative information and
              take remote control of the server.  (2) The installer installs
              a default username and password for the adminstrative console
              if auto-detect of settings is used.  (3) There are also several
              serious file permissions problems.

Problems:

(1) Chili!Soft ASP ships with samples scripts which are located in
    /opt/casp/caspsamp by default and are installed on webservers by default
    accessable via http://<server>/caspsamp/ A sample script named
    codebrws.asp prolly taken from IIS/4.0 originally is vulnerable to a
    "../" attack allowing sensative information to be revieled to remote
    users.  During brief testing I was only able to get the script to read
    files on directory above the caspsamp directory which is the /opt/casp
    directory by default.  This directory contains database
    usernames/passwords, the server logs, and the username/password to
    administration console.  With the password to the administrative console
    a remote user with web access can remotely manage the server thus
    openning endless possibilies since the console runs as root.

    It appears they attempted to prevent people from viewing files outside
    the samples directory because when I tried with an url not containing
    /caspsamp/ at the begining it would fail and warn me that I'm not allowed
    to view files outside the samples directory.

(2) The installer program installs a default username and password for
    adminstration console which is remotely accessable via the web.  The
    username/password are stored in the file /opt/admin/conf/service.pwd

    which is probably the only file installed with the correct permissions
    (in this case mode 600).

(3) There are several files installed mode 666 which is a serious no-no as
    some logs and configuration files are affected by this. On my system the
    following files were installed mode 666:

/opt/casp/logs/install_summary
/opt/casp/logs/install
/opt/casp/logs/register
/opt/casp/logs/server-3000
/opt/casp/logs/component
/opt/casp/caspsamp/401K/database/QEDBF.INI
/opt/casp/caspsamp/friendship/agent/database/QEDBF.INI
/opt/casp/caspsamp/friendship/client/database/QEDBF.INI
/opt/casp/caspsamp/QEDBF.INI
/opt/casp/chilicom/lib/hkey.current.user
/opt/casp/chilicom/lib/hkey.local.machine
/opt/casp/INSTALL/.webserver-cache
/opt/casp/.installed_db
/opt/casp/admin/conf/hkey.current.user
/opt/casp/admin/conf/hkey.local.machine
/opt/casp/admin/logs/server

    This may seem bad it gets worse.  Most of the files dealing with
    databases such as global_odbc.ini and odbc.ini are all world-readable and
    thus by default expose passwords administrators may lator install to
    local users.  All configuration files for the server and subsequent other
    services offered Chili!Soft ASP are also world-readable exposing even
    more useful information to local users.

Examples:
http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../admin/conf/service.pwd
http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../global_odbc.ini
http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../admin/logs/server
http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../LICENSE.LIC
http://<server>/caspsamp/codebrws.asp?source=/caspsamp/../logs/server-3000

Solution: Remove all references to the sample ASP file in your httpd.conf and
replace the default admin account.  Then change file permissions in /opt/casp
as your system security dictates (in other words figure it out for yourself)

Vendor Status: Vendor was e-mailed these problems on December 30, 2000.

Copyright )2001 Stan Bubrouski
This article was originally published on Wednesday Feb 21st 2001
Home
Mobile Site | Full Site